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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The plaintiff, Michael P. O'Connor ("O'Connor"), appeals from a grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants who had not already been dismissed from the case (the
"Parents"). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Issue: Whether O'Connor has met his burden of identifying, as to each defendant, a
statement capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning.
Standard of Review: Whether a plaintiff has met the burden of identifying, as to each
defendant, a statement capable fo sustaining a defamatory meaning is a question of
law. See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994).

2.

Issue: Whether O'Connor was a "public official" for purposes of defamation.
Standard of Review: The determination of a defamation plaintiffs public official
status is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See Wayment v. Clear Channel
Broadcasing, Inc., 2005 UT 25, f 17, 116 P.3d 271.

3.

Issue: Whether O'Connor adduced evidence that the Parents acted with "actual
malice."
Standard of Review: "Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of
malice is a question of law." Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896,905
(Utah 1992).

4.

Issue: Whether the Parents' statements were absolutely privileged.
Standard of Review: "The existence of a privilege is a question of law for the
[C]ourt." Id. at 900.

5.

Issue: Whether the Parents9 statements were qualifiedly privileged.
Standard of Review: "The existence of a privilege is a question of law for the
[CJourt." Id

6.

Issue: Whether O'Connor adduced evidence that the Parents acted with "common
law malice."
Standard of Review: "Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of
[common law] malice is a question of law." Id. at 905.

7.

Issue: Whether issues regarding the district court's award of costs are properly before
this Court.
Standard of Review: Whether issues are properly before this Court is a question of
law. See State v. Jameston, 800 P.2d 798, 801-02 (Utah 1990).

8.

Issue: Whether the Parents' Verified Memorandum of Costs was timely filed.
Standard of Review: "The application of the time limit is also a question of law,
reviewed for correctness." Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252, 1257
(Utah CLApp. 1996).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES

United States Constitution amend. I
Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech
. . . or the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.
Utah Constitution art. I, § 1
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to . . . petition
for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
-2-

Utah Constitution art. I, § 15
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press....
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-421(l)(a)
No civil action by or on behalf of a student to the professional
competence or performance of a licensed employee of aschool
district,... or a violation of ethical conduct by an employee of
a school district, may be brought in a court until at least 60 days
after the filing of a written complaint with the local board of
education of the district, or until findings have been issued by
the local board after a hearing on the complaint, whichever is
sooner.
Utah R. App. P. 3(d)
The notice of appeal... shall designate the judgment or order,
or part thereof, appealed from.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
O' Connor brought a lawsuit alleging defamation against thirty-one named defendants.
Four of those defendants were dismissed from the lawsuit. The remaining defendants (the
Parents) moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and dismissed,
with prejudice, O'Connor's claims against the Parents. The district court also awarded costs
to the Parents. Prior to the district court's order awarding costs to the Parents, O'Connor
filed a notice of appeal from the order of dismissal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
"[W]e thought I would put my name in for an opportunity/'
While attending Brigham Young University ("BYU"), O'Connor was a student
teacher and assistant coach to Dave Houle, a full-time teacher and coach at Mountain View
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High School in Orem, Utah. (R. 1145a, 1146a.)1 Following graduation from BYU,
O'Connor worked as the head coach of the girls' basketball team at Bellflower High School
for about seven years. (R. 1147a.)
Beginning in about 1998, O'Connor applied for four other coaching positions in
California. (R. 1145,1145a.) He received one offer, which he declined. (Id.) Then, in the
spring of 2001, Dave Houle called O'Connor and told him that there might be a teaching and
coaching position opening at Mountain View High School in Orem. (R. 1145a.) O'Connor
traveled to Utah to submit an application with the Alpine School District and apply for the
position. (R. 1144,1145a.) Although he was interviewed for the position at Mountain View
High School, the job was offered to someone else. (R. 1144.)
After her husband did not get the job at Mountain View High School, O'Connor's
wife found a posting on the Alpine School District's web page for a position at Lehi High
School as the head coach of the girls' basketball team. (R. 1146.) O'Connor and his wife
"thought [he should] put [his] name in for an opportunity," so he called Lehi High School
and left a message, saying that he had an application on file with the district and was
interested in the position at Lehi High School. (R. 1144.) The Lehi High School principal,
Mr. Sheldon Worthington, then called O'Connor and initiated an interview. (R. 1144.) After
the District agreed to allow O'Connor to teach sociology and American problems classes

1

Some pages in the Record have information on both sides; however, Record numbers
appear only on the front of each page. Accordingly, for clarity, citations in this brief to the
front side of a page in the Record are made by simply referencing the appropriate page
number, i.e., R. 100. Citations to the reverse side of a page in the Record are made by
referencing the appropriate page number and adding an"a," i.e., R. 100a.
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(courses for which he lacked a teaching endorsement), O'Connor accepted an offer to teach
and coach at Lehi High School. (R. 1142, 1143, 1143a, 1144a.)2
Head Coaching Responsibilities
As head coach, O'Connor oversaw the budget for the Lehi High School girls'
basketball program, which was allocated from public funds. (R. 1136.) He also oversaw a
number of fundraising efforts, which raised money through donations directly from members
of the community. (R. 1137,1137a.) O'Connor decided which girls made the team, and he
was responsible for the activities of those girls while on the team. (R. 1121.) He was also
responsible for a coaching staff of four assistant coaches. (R. 1140, 1141a.) O'Connor
directed the team's travel, not only with respect to regular season road games, but also to the
annual state playoff tournament and to an annual invitational tournament in Arizona. (R.
1106,1108a, 1137a.) He was also responsible for the girls' participation in a spring league,
summer workouts, and a team camp during the spring or summer. (R. 1103 a.)
"There's yelling, yeah. There's nothing wrong with that."
With O'Connor at the helm, the Lehi High School girls' basketball team's winning
percentage improved (R. 659), but his approach to communicating with the girls caused
concern among some parents. (R. 1105a.) In this regard, O'Connor testified as follows:
Q.

Okay? You were approached by the parents who had
some concern on how you were treating their daughters,
screaming at them, yelling at them; right?

2

O'Connor states that "while successfully coaching in California," he "was recruited
to coach at Lehi High School." (Appellant's Brief, p. 7.) There is no Record evidence
regarding his success in California, and he was "recruited" by only to the extent that
Principal Worthington returned his phone message and initiated the interview process.
-5-

A.

I've had some come to me, yes.

Q.

So it's not true that you were not aware of the concern
that you were screaming and yelling at the players?

A.

It wasn't - I mean it depends how we're defining
screaming and yelling here.

Q.

Well, right now we're defining it the way the parents did
when they approached you and asked you not to do it.

A.

I've had some come to me about their daughter being
yelled at, yes.

Q.

Did you ever scream and rave at the girls?

A.

I yelled as, like I said earlier last time, like any other
coach.

Q.

You see where it says "Harrison said the team gets yelled
at sometimes when they fail to run plays or follow
directions, but said she's grown accustomed to that in
sports." Is that a true statement?

A.

There's yelling, yeah. There's nothing wrong with that.

Q.

Well, you had - you indicated there's at least two that
talked to you about screaming at their children.

A.

One during that season, one during her sophomore
season two years prior.

Q.

So you knew that there were those concerns as well? At
least on the part of those parents?

A.

That particular parent. And we worked that out with that
daughter.

(R. 1105a.)

(R. 1106a.)

(R. 1098a.)
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Q.

And you didn't scream at her anymore?

A.

We worked around that.

Q.

Had you screamed at her?

A.

Have I yelled at her? As a coach yells at players, yeah.

(R. 1104a.)
"[She was] our best player... [and] all our girls knew that."
During the 2003 to 2004 season, there also developed a concern among players and
parents that O'Connor favored one girl on the team over the others and treated her
differently. (E.g., R. 1157.) Specifically, Michelle Harrison ("Michelle") was considered
by O'Connor to be the "best player" on the team, and he believed that "all [the] girls knew
that [she was]." (R. 1110.) Indeed, as O'Connor observes in his brief, "[subsequent to the
filing of this appeal, [Michelle] was named the top high school girls basketball player in Utah
by The Deseret News and was named to the McDonalds All Americans, an honor given to
the top 24 high school senior girl basketball players in the U.S." (Appellant's Brief, p. 7.)
Accordingly, when Michelle was a sophomore, O'Connor named her to be one of the two
team captains, and he told the seniors on the team that they could take turns filling the other
captain slot. (R. 1110.) O'Connor also testified that Michelle was not required to abide by
standards imposed on other team members in that, at two different tournaments, he allowed
Michelle to travel and room with her mother (and stay out late on one occasion), while the
rest of the team was required to travel on the team bus and stay together. (R. 1127, 1127a.)
Michelle was also allowed during games to wear a different color of shoes than the other
girls, who were all required to all wear the same color of shoes. (R. 1167.) O'Connor denied
-7-

other allegations of preferential treatment toward Michelle (e.g., R. 1106, 1107a.) but
acknowledged "that there were problems with team unity." (R. 1126.)

Ultimately,

O'Connor admitted telling the team that if they caused Michelle to leave Lehi High School
he would quit as their coach. (R. 1102a.) When school administrators discussed the asserted
preferential treatment with Michelle's mother, she responded: "Well, I can do whatever I
damn well please

No one would have stopped me." (R. 1164.)

"[I]t would be out of compliance now but it wasn't then/'
In addition to issues related to O'Connor's coaching style and preferential treatment
of Michelle, there were concerns raised by some parents that O'Connor may have improperly
recruited Megan Heriford ("Megan") to transfer from Mountain View High School to Lehi
High School. (R. 1159a.) In this regard, O'Connor testified that he knew Megan before she
transferred to Lehi High School and that her parents contacted him regarding their desire that
she transfer to Lehi High School for her senior season. (R. 1139,1139a.) O'Connor testified
that Megan's parents told him that they wanted Megan to transfer to Lehi High School in
order to have "an opportunity to play." (R. 1139a.) Correspondingly, Parents of girls
already on the team were concerned
that the only reason [Megan] was coming to play for Lehi is
because she could not make the team from Mountain View, that
she wasn't going to have a starting role or a major role or that
she would see little or no playing time, where coming to Lehi
she would be able to make a contribution to the program. But
by thus doing, she would displace other girls who had been in
the program.
(R. 1159a.)
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O'Connor testified that he advised the Herifords to contact the Lehi High School
assistant principal in charge of athletics to make sure that if Megan transferred, it would be
in compliance with the rules of the Utah High School Athletic Association ("UHSAA"). (R.
113 9a.) O' Connor then also called the assistant principal himself to notify him that "that [the
Herifords] were thinking of transferring [and] that they may be calling him." (Id.)
At the time, a student could transfer schools in compliance with UHSAA rules by
either (1) obtaining written consent from the principals of both schools, or (2) physically
moving into the new school's boundaries. (R. 1138.) The Herifords moved to within the
Lehi High School boundaries (id.\ and Lehi High School conducted "home visits . . . to the
residence to make sure that they did, in fact, have a residence in the attendance area." (R.
1159a.) Principal Worthington testified that, after the school's investigation, he concluded
that O'Connor had not engaged in wrongful recruiting under the UHSAA rules in effect at
the time. (Id.) The evidence is unclear, however, as to whether Lehi High School actually
notified the concerned parents of the results of this investigation, where Principal
Worthington testified as follows:
A.

Did I believe he was wrongfully recruiting? No.

Q.

Did you discuss that with the parents, your belief?

A.

I didn't specifically. My assistants did. They said that
they would follow up to make sure that we were totally
compliant with UHSAA rules and that was done.

(Id) Principal Worthington also testified that, although permissible at the time, Megan's
transfer to Lehi High School would be out of compliance with current UHSAA rules. (R.
1159a.)
-9-

"You're going to get fired . . . if you don't answer
to what you're doing with the money."
Finally, concerns were raised that O'Connor may have been mishandling monies
raised by the girls. (E.g., R. 776.) Ms. Judi Harrison, Michelle's mother, told O'Connor of
this concern in November of 2003, stating: "You're going to get fired for the money if you
don't answer to what you're doing with the money." (R. 776, 1138a.) In response,
O'Connor called a meeting for all of the parents with girls on the team. (R. 776.) At least
one parent of each girl on the team attended the meeting. (R. 1137.) There, although
O'Connor explained his position with respect to team finances (R. 837-41) and "kept asking
for questions" the parents "didn't ask [any questions]." (R. 775.)
Some parents took their concerns regarding O'Connor's possible mishandling of funds
to school administrators. (R. 1248,1269.) The school investigated and concluded that there
had been no mishandling of funds by O'Connor. (R. 1248, 1268.) But the school did not
communicate the results of their investigation to the concerned parents, as Principal
Worthington testified:
A.

I can see how parents might misconstrue or
misunderstand, not having knowledge of how public
education funds are used, how they're recorded, the
purchasing procedures. So I - this is not the first time
that a coach or staff member has been questioned about
monies.

Q.

Do you believe that it's constructive - well, you believe
that that issue had been resolved through your
investigation, correct?

A.

I believe it was resolved.
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Q.

And you believe that was communicated back to the
parents?

A.

I don't know to what degree. I think it was mentioned,
but I didn't write, I mean I didn't make an attempt to
communicate to every parent.

(R. 1248.)
Timeline of Relevant Communications
Some of the foregoing concerns were raised with school administrators in November
2003, prior to the start of basketball season. (R. 1160.) At that time, Principal Worthington
discussed the concerns with his assistant principals, and they decided to simply monitor the
situation. (Id.) In March 2004, after the conclusion of the state tournament in February,
several parents again raised their concerns with school administrators. (R. 1160a, 1168a.)
In response, the principal, athletic director, and assistant coaches met with a number of
parents individually. (R. 1159, 1166a, 1167.) After talking to, and receiving letters from,
a number of the parents, administrators met with O'Connor and informed him of the parents
concerns. (R. 1159,1159a.) O'Connor, however, expressly refused to meet with the parents
as a group to discuss their concerns. (R. 1138.) Accordingly, the parents held a meeting of
their own on March 9, 2004, and minutes were kept of this meeting. (R. 1015-17.)
On April 14, 2004, Principal Worthington sent a letter to the parents, in which he
stated in part:
I recently had the opportunity to speak with several of you about
ways to improve . . . basketball program....
It was interesting to me that everyone no matter whose daughter
was on the team wanted the same thing. It was also interesting
that even though individual perceptions were at times directly in
-11-

opposition with each other, everybody spoke with a conviction
and passion that was compelling. Where in lies the truth? The
truth lies in each one's perception. Individual perception
becomes the truth no matter what did or didn't happen. The
question really becomes, "What is each person, parent, player,
and coach willing to do?" If one is not willing to try to change
their perception, there is no point in trying because whatever is
done will never be good enough. If this is your reality, perhaps
the best thing for you to do is to move to another community
and program....
Upon review of the whole situation we have set forward the
following guidelines and recommendations:
1.

We have spoken to Coach O'Connor and given him
recommendations shared with us by all parents. He has
committed to examine and improve the program
wherever he can. He has our full support.

4.

Parents are invited to express any concerns they might
have to LHS administration. We will carefully consider
each concern brought to our attention and pass it along.

6.

We ask that you communicate to the coaches individual
concerns of schedule conflicts, injuries, illness, etc., and
items related to [team parties and rides to practice]. All
other communication should go through administration.

7.

We ask our coaches to coach. Do not contact any coach
for anything other than the aforementioned items.
Violation of this rule will jeopardize your daughter's
position on the team.

(R. 1171-72 (emphasis in original).)
By June, some parents still had concerns regarding O'Connor. (R. 1152,1152a.) One
parent, Gary Burningham, approached Alpine School Board member Donna Barnes for
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direction. (Id.) Being fairly new to the Board, Ms. Barnes contacted the School Board
president, who told Ms. Barnes: "This is not without precedent. You need to tell them that
they should build a case." (R. 1151a.) Ms. Barnes then told Mr. Burningham: "you have
to make your case." (R. 1152a.) Thus, several weeks later, Mr. Burningham delivered to
Ms. Barnes a set of letters, some from parents and some from other relatives and friends of
girls on the team. (R. 1152a, 1015-87.) Ms. Barnes read the letters and then gave them to
the secretary of the school superintendent.3 (R. 1151, 1152a.)
A few weeks later, concerned parents and others attended the regularly-scheduled
School Board Meeting on July 20, 2004. (R. 1008-13.) At that meeting, five parents
addressed the board regarding their concerns with the Lehi High School girls' basketball
program.4 (R. 1011-12.) Ms. Barnes testified about the School Board meeting as follows:
Q.

Okay. Do you personally believe that the parents were
exercising their rights as parents living in the school
district to voice concerns at a school board meeting about
what they perceived to be problems?

A.

That's the policy of the board, that if there are concerns,
they may address the board in an open board meeting. It
happens routinely.

3

O'Connor cites pages 1233-37 and 1243 and asserts that Ms. Barnes was "[a]cting
in her private capacity and not as an official act of the School Board" (Appellant's Brief, p.
9), but he identifies no evidence in these pages to support that conclusion.
4

O'Connor states that "four of the Parents" addressed the School Board, "the
maximum allowed to speak by the Board." (Appellant's Brief, p. 9.) Five parents addressed
the Board, but one of them was not named as a defendant; thus, only four "Parents"
addressed the Board. Also of note, O'Connor is unable to point to any evidence that the
Board allowed only five people to speak. While not important substantively, this is another
example of O'Connor's tendency to recite "facts" that are not supported by the Record.
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Q.

Was everyone courteous and attempting to —

A.

Very courteous, very professional in their behavior.

Q.

Okay. And certainly there's nothing unusual about
parents writing letters to be reviewed by the board as
supplemental information to -

A.

We get those routinely also.

Q.

Okay. And did you consider those to be constructive
letters in attempting to resolve a problem?

A.

I did.

(R. 1151a, 1239.) The letters that Mr. Burningham had given to Ms. Barnes were not
distributed during the meeting. (R. 1151.) After the meeting, the School Board gave the
letters to Principal Worthington. (R. 1157.) He chose not to read them. (Id.) Instead, he
gave them to a vice principal, Rick Robbins, and asked him to show them to O'Connor. (R.
1165.) Three school administrators - (1) Mr. Robbins, (2) the athletic director, Mr. Allan,
and (3) another Vice Principal, Mari Braithwaite - then met with O'Connor to show him the
letters. (Id.) However, none of these administrators read the letters themselves. (R. 1157.)
"[T]here is no problem so I have nothing I need to work on."
O' Connor's response to the letters was ccthat there was no problem." (R. 1165a.) Even
when "Mr. Robbins mentioned . . . that there was a perception that there is [a problem] and
as the coach we need to take ownership in those perceptions," O'Connor's response "still
was that there is no problem so I have nothing I need to work on." (Id.) Indeed, although
Mr. Worthington and Mr. Allan offered "to meet with [O'Connor] with parents, to go to their
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homes if we needed to and visit with them," O'Connor "didn't respond." (R. 1155a.)
Principal Worthington was then informed that O' Connor had said he might cut from the team
two daughters of parents he believed had been particularly outspoken. (R. 1158.) Principal
Worthington responded by telling O'Connor that he could not cut girls "based on what their
parents had done":
I indicated to him that these girls, one girl was, as a sophomore
started every game on the season, was a major player; the other
one received a large amount of playing time. I told him that if
they were cut from the team, it would have to be that those that
were coming into the program were clearly superior ball players
than they were.
(R. 1158a.)
Q.

What did Coach O'Connor say to you in response to your
telling him that he could not cut these two girls?

A.

Coach O'Connor was upset about that. He reiterated the
fact that he should be able to cut who he wants to, that
that was his decision to make as coach.

(Id.) Because O'Connor refused to agree not to cut girls from the team on the basis that their
parents had expressed concerns regarding him, Principal Worthington relieved O'Connor of
his duties as head coach of the girls' basketball team. (R. 1157a.) In this regard, Principal
Worthington testified as follows:
Q.

If Coach O' Connor had committed to you that these girls
would not be cut from the team, would he have been
released?

A.

No.

Q.

So that was the straw as it were?

A.

Yes, sir.
-15-

(Id.)5 O'Connor, however, was retained as both a teacher and a coach at Lehi High School.
(R. 1250.)
O'Connor's Publication of the Letters
After being given the letters that the parents submitted to the School Board, O'Connor
shared them with Michelle's mother. (R. 1110a.) Michelle's mother then arranged a
meeting between herself; O'Connor's attorney, Mr. Rust; and a newspaper reporter. (R.
1088,1089.) At that meeting the letters were present and discussed. (R. 1089.) O'Connor,
though not present at that meeting (R. 1189a), also shared portions of the letters with the
newspaper reporter when she interviewed him. (R. 1109.)
The Lawsuit
O'Connor filed a defamation lawsuit against twenty-seven Parents.6 (R. 1-8.) When
asked during discovery to identify a defamatory statement made by each of the Parents,
O'Connor designated as defamatory (1) the oral statements of some of the Parents at the
March 9, 2004 parents meeting, (2) the oral statements made by some of the Parents at the
July 20,2004 School Board meeting, (3) and thirty-seven different letters, comprising at least
60 pages. (R. 1008-82,1085-87.) In no legal pleading has O'Connor identified, as to each

5

Citing pages 1224-25 of the Record, O'Connor states that "[a]s a direct result of the
Parents' defamatory publications, [he] was terminated as the girls basketball coach."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 10.) However, pages 1224-25 are from the affidavit of Michelle's
father, in which he simply gives his "opinion that the reason Principal Worthington did not
renew [O'Connor's] coaching position in the fall of 2004 was because of the defamatory
comments of [the Parents]."
6

O'Connor originally named thirty-one defendants; four were later dismissed. The
Parents are those defendants who were not dismissed prior to summary judgment.
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of the Parents, a separate statement attributable to each that he believes is defamatory. (E.g.,
R. 1178-1222.) Indeed, even in his brief on appeal, O'Connor identifies no specific language
he believes is defamatory. (Appellant's Brief, generally.) Rather, in his statement of facts,
he summarizes the letters broadly, in his own words,7 without quoting them, and without
identifying specific statements attributable to specific Parent defendants. (Id, pp. 7-11.)
Then, in the argument section of his brief, he simply says:

"[The] defamatory

communications are amply cited in the Material Facts submitted to the trial court and
supported as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 56." (Id., p. 14.)
During his deposition, O'Connor testified as a lay fact witness with some specificity
regarding which specific statements he regards as defamatory. (E.g., R. 1130,113 la.) In so
doing, as to at least four of the letters, O'Connor could not identify anything about the letter
that he believed to be defamatory, only that the letter ccwas with the rest of the letters" (R.
1099), was "used as part of the whole group" (R. 1101), was "just part of everything else"
(R. 1101a), or was defamatory when "looking at the whole picture" (R. 1130a).
Furthermore, seven of the letters O'Connor designates as defamatory were authored or coauthored by persons who were not named as defendants in the underlying lawsuit - Chad
Hillstead, Kade Hillstead, Michael Hyde, Amanda Hyde, Kayla Burningham, Breezy
Chandler, and Mrs. Jex. (R. 8, 1185-86.) Additionally, one of the letters was co-authored

7

In at least one blatant respect, O'Connor's characterization of the letters is wholly
unsupported by the Record. Specifically, he states that the letters accuse him "of physical
. . . abuse," and he supports this statement with a citation to sixty pages of the Record.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8.) Nowhere in those pages is there any reference to O'Connor
physically abusing the girls. (R. 718-78.)
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by John Jex, who was dismissed from the lawsuit. (R. 896-97,1185.) Likewise, three of the
statements made at the March 9, 2004 parents meeting (which O'Connor designates as a
source of defamation against him) were made by persons who were not named as defendants
in the underlying lawsuit - Robert Gray, Michael Hyde, and Cindy Hyde. (R. 1015-17.)
Filing of the Verified Memorandum of Costs and Notice of Appeal
On January 11,2006, the trial court entered its final judgment in favor of the Parents.
(R. 1366.) The Parents' Verified Memorandum of Costs was thus due on January 19,2006.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 6(a), 54(d)(2). The Parents mailed their Verified Memorandum of Costs
from Salt Lake City to the court in Provo, and to O'Connor's counsel, on January 18,2006.
(R. 1487,1540.) The filed Verified Memorandum of Costs bears a date stamp of January 20,
2006, at 9:30 a.m. (R. 1494.) The trial court ultimately awarded costs to the Parents. (R.
1553.)
On January 17,2006, prior to filing of the Verified Memorandum of Costs, or the trial
court's ruling on O'Connor's Motion to Tax the Verified Memorandum of Costs, O'Connor
filed his Notice of Appeal from "the final judgment issued . . . on January 10, 2006." (R.
1495, 1552-60.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
O'Connor nowhere identifies, as to each of the twenty-seven Parent defendant, a
specific statement that is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning. Rather, he has
dumped on the Court the burden of combing the record to identify and analyze such a
statement as to each Parent defendant.

-18-

The trial court granted summary judgment on the basis that O'Connor is a public
official and produced no evidence that the Parents acted with actual malice. A public official
is a public employee whose position is one that attracts public comment and scrutiny of the
person holding it, regardless of whether there has been any particular controversy raised.
O'Connor's varsity head coaching position plainly fits this description, and he has adduced
no evidence that the Parents' statements were made with actual malice.
Even if O'Connor were not a public official, the Parents' statements were absolutely
privileged. The United States and Utah Constitutions each protect the right of citizens to
petition government officials for redress of grievances. This right is absolute in the context
of quasi-judicial proceedings of boards that hold discretion to apply the law to the facts. This
Court should hold that, given the statutory authority vested in school boards of this state, the
Parents communications to the Alpine School Board were absolutely privileged.
The Parents' communications of which O'Connor complains, were also qualifiedly
privileged. A qualified privilege protects statements between persons sharing a common
interest. The Parents and school administrators shared a common interest in the welfare of
girls on the team and in the qualifications of public school teachers. When a common
interest exists, a plaintiff must prove common law malice to sustain a defamation action.
O'Connor has adduced no evidence of common law malice.
Finally, O'Connor's Notice of Appeal did not designate the trial court's ruling on
costs as part of the judgment appealed from, as required. Thus, issues regarding the award
of costs are not properly before the Court. Even if they were, the Parents' Verified
Memorandum of Costs was timely filed.
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ARGUMENT
L
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PARENTS BECAUSE
O'CONNOR HAS NOT IDENTIFIED, AS TO EACH OF THE
PARENTS, A STATEMENT THAT IS CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A
DEFAMATORY MEANING.
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
Parents because O'Connor has not identified, as to each of the Parent defendants, a statement
that is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning. This is so in two respects. First,
O'Connor has fundamentally failed to even identify a specific, separate statement as to each
Parent defendant that he claims is defamatory. Second, communications that O'Connor
references generally as forming the basis of his defamation claims are not capable of
sustaining a defamatory meaning.
A.

O'Connor Has Failed to Identify a Specific Allegedly Defamatory
Statement as to Each Parent Defendant.

O'Connor begins the argument section of his brief on appeal by asserting that "the
communications at issue were capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning." (Appellant's
Brief, p. 13.) However, he has failed to identify a specific, allegedly defamatory statement
as to each Parent defendant, and his claims against the Parents must, therefore, fail.8

8

This argument was raised and briefed in the trial court (R. 987, 1319-20); and,
although the trial court did not base its summary judgment ruling on this ground, the "longstanding rule is that this Court may affirm a judgment of a lower court on a ground other than
that relied on by that court." Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988).
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In Utah, a defamation Plaintiff need not identify in his complaint "with complete
specificity when, where, to whom, or by whom, the alleged defamatory statements were
made." Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Med. Center, Inc., 2005 UT App. 325, f 3, 122 P.3d
891. Even at the pleading stage, however, the plaintiff is required to "set forth in words or
words to that effect" the "language complained of." Dennett v. Smith, 21 Utah 2d 368,445
P.2d 983, 984 (Utah 1968). This case is well past the pleading stage. At this point, a
plaintiffs identification of the when, where, to whom, by whom, and specific words that
support his defamation claims must, as to each claim, be specific enough to allow a court to
determine "[w]hether a [particular] statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory
meaning." West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994) (emphasis
added). For example, in West, both the trial and appellate courts examined specific phrases
within newspaper editorials to determine whether the words used were defamatory. See id.
at 1001-03,1008-1 \\seealso, e.g., Waymentv. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 UT
25, Tf 51, 116 P.3d 271 (setting forth two specific sentences as alleged defamation); Russell
v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1992) (identifying and analyzing
specific quotations from a newspaper article that plaintiff believed to be defamatory).
Here, O'Connor merely summarizes in his own words over sixty pages of allegedly
defamatory material. Moreover, he admits that a number of these communications are not
defamatory of themselves but only defamatory "with the rest of the letters" or viewed "as
part of the whole group." (R. 1099, 1101.)9 Additionally, seven of the letters O'Connor

9

In a sense, O'Connor thus seems to be pursuing a joint and several liability theory
of defamation where, because ail of the Parents were speaking on the same general topic,
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designates as defamatory were authored or co-authored by persons who are not named as
defendants in this case. One of the letters was co-authored by John Jex, who was been
dismissed from the lawsuit; and, three of the statements made at the March 9,2004 parents
meeting were made by persons who were also not named as defendants in the underlying
lawsuit. With respect to his burden to identify, as to each Parent defendant, a particular
statement which he believes to be defamatory, O'Connor has overlooked the caution that
"[t]his [Cjourt is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of
argument and research." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998). While O'Connor
cites proper authority for what constitutes defamation in Utah, he does not engage in
application of that authority to any single specific statement by any single Parent defendant.
"Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) [of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure] requires not just bald
citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority." Id. In this respect, O'Connor has not complied with rule 24, but rather has
"shift[ed] the burden of research and argument to [this] [C]ourt." Id.
In Doggettv. Regents of Univ. of California, 2003 WL 21666102 (July 1, 2003 Cal.
Superior), although the plaintiff alleged the defendants had said or implied "[t]hat Plaintiff
was a 'traitor' . . . [tjhat Plaintiff 'couldn't be trusted'... [and t]hat no one likes a 'snitch,
tattle-tale,'" he lost on summary judgement because he had "fail[ed] to identify any

they are each responsible for the specific words used by every other Parent, and even by
parents, friends, and family members of girls on the team not named as defendants. Yet
O'Connor cites no authority for such an approach. On the contrary, the settled rule is that
for each defamation claim there must be a particular statement made by a particular person,
capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning.
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defamatory statement attributable to any individual defendant." Id. at *2-*3. O'Connor's
case suffers from the same deficiency. He has failed to identify at least one specific,
allegedly defamatory statement published by each of the Parents leaves both the Parents and
this Court in the untenable position of having to sift through and dissect the numerous letters
and oral communications he identifies, predicting the phrases he may find objectionable, and
then setting forth analysis based on these guesses that the words do not sustain a defamatory
meaning. That is not this Court's burden. Nor is it the Parents'. Speaking of the specificity
with which plaintiffs must plead defamation, this Court has said: "[T]he defendant should
not be required to resort to the ofttimes expensive discovery process to drag from a litigant
what he really intends to do to his adversary by a vehicle shrouded in mystery." Dennett,
445 P.2d at 984. Here, the expensive discovery process has ended, O'Connor has had ample
chance to identify the defamatory statements upon which he relies, and still the identity of
those statements remains "shrouded in mystery." Id. Accordingly, the Court affirm
summary judgment in favor of the Parents on the ground that O'Connor has failed to identify
as to each Parent defendant "a statement... capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning."
West, 872P.2datl008.
B.

Communications that O'Connor References as Forming the Basis of His
Claims Are Not Capable of Sustaining a Defamatory Meaning.

Without assuming O'Connor's burden to identify the specific statements upon which
he bases his defamation claims, the Parents note that communications representative of those
he identifies as the basis for his claims are not capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning.10

10

This argument was raised and briefed in the trial court (R. 987.)
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This is because the letters and other communications upon which O'Connor purports to base
his defamation claims contain expressions of opinion and/or verifiable fact. "[Expressions
of pure opinion fuel the marketplace of ideas[,] . . . are incapable of being verified, [and]
cannot serve as the basis for defamation liability." West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d
999, 1015 (Utah 1994).11 Additionally, "[i]n this state, truth is an absolute defense to an
action for defamation." Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991). By way
of example, O'Connor identifies the following letter from Parent defendant Ruby Ray as the
sole possible basis for his defamation claim against her:
To Whom It May Concern: I write this letter to address my
concern of the program at Lehi High School, Girls Basketball.
I have watched my granddaughter go from a very confident
Young Lady, that loves basketball, to a timid not sure of her self
player. She loves the game and wants to continue playing as
long as time allows. However I know that as long as things stay
the same at Lehi, and every play needs to run through one
player, I don't see her wanting to play.
In following the girls basketball program all season, I noticed
that one player stood out in all the stats the paper would give.
I don't for a minute discount her as a great player, however at
games I was able to attend, I could see that she was left in even
when Lehi was up by a very safe distance. I could not see why
the others on the bench were left to sit and watch instead of
building the team for the future. I know that it is important to
develop your best players, however I think it is also just as
important to develop your whole team. I am concerned, I think
things need to be changed in the program.
One last thing I would like you to consider, I think the pressure
put on this one girl by the coach is not healthy. At the state

11

Notably, the trial court found that "[a]ll of the declarations [of which O'Connor
complains] appear to be forthright descriptions of what they had observed coupled with their
opinion as to the effect of the situation upon their children." (R. 1349.)
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tournament this past year she fell apart. I think she blamed
herself, and I think the pressure she felt was just too much for a
high school sophomore.
Sincerely Ruby Ray
(R. 1082.) Many of the statements in this letter are mere opinion - i.e., "I know that as long
as things stay the same at Lehi,... I don't see [my granddaughter] wanting to play." And,
while others may be construed as factual assertions - i.e., "every play needs to run through
one player" - O'Connor has cited no evidence to show that they are not true or are in dispute.
This is especially true of allegedly defamatory statements regarding O'Connor's
communications with the girls - i.e., "He also had her so scared of touching the ball, afraid
she might be yelled at or called a name." (R. 1080) - where O'Connor admits to having
regularly yelled at the girls. Even had O'Connor identified a specific statement by each
Parent defendant, it is likely that any such statement would be an expression of opinion or
of admitted fact. Accordingly, this Court should affirm on this additional ground the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Parents.
II.
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PARENTS BECAUSE
(1) O'CONNOR WAS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL AND (2) O'CONNOR
FAILED TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF
ACTUAL MALICE.
O' Connor's claims against the Parents are for defamation. A defamation plaintiff that
is deemed to be a "public official" may not recover "for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' - that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
-25-

Van Dyke v. KUTV, 663 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1983). The trial court concluded that, in light of
the undisputed facts, O'Connor was a public official. The trial court also concluded that
there is no evidence to support a finding of actual malice on the part of the Parents. The trial
court then granted summary judgment in favor of the Parents on the basis of these two
conclusions. This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the Parents because, indeed, (1) O'Connor was a public official, and (2) O'Connor failed
to adduce evidence to support a finding of actual malice on the part of the Parents.
A.

O'Connor Was a Public Official.

O'Connor was a public official. To be a public official, one must, like O'Connor, be
a public employee. See Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah 1988). However, "not all
public employees are 'public officials,' and those who are 'public officials' do not have that
legal status for every kind of defamation." Id. Thus, for "public official" status to apply in
a particular case, two conditions must be met: "(1) . . . the person must occupy a position
which invites public scrutiny, and ( 2 ) . . . the alleged defamation must relate to the conduct
of the person while in that capacity." Id. As to the second of these elements, O'Connor does
not dispute that the statements of which he complained relate to his conduct as a public high
school coach. As to the first element, the undisputed evidence shows that O'Connor
occupied a position that invited public scrutiny and was, therefore, a public official.
This Court has elaborated on the first of the two foregoing elements by explaining that
a person is a public official when employed in a public position that "'has such apparent
importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance
of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and
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performance of all government employees.9" Van Dyke, 663 P.2d at 54-55 (citation omitted).
Stated another way, "'the employee's position must be one which would invite public
scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and
discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy."9 Id. at 55 (citation omitted).
Under the foregoing standard, O'Connor clearly was a public official.
L

Public School Teachers are Public Officials.

O'Connor insists that the public official inquiry in this case is whether public school
teachers are, in every instance, public officials.12 As O'Connor observes, Utah courts have
not addressed whether a public school teacher is a public official. However, this Court has
observed that "[i]n civilized societies since antiquity it has been realized that the welfare,
training and education of children are of such vital importance as to be a matter of public
concern." In re KB., 7 Utah 2d 398, 401, 326 P.2d 395, 396 (1958). This Court has also
stated, in the context of a "public official" analysis, that "'where public matters are involved,
the doubts should be resolved in favor of freedom of expression rather than against it.'" Van
Dyke, 663 P.2d at 54 (citation omitted). As the logical extension of these expressions, this
Court should concur with those other jurisdictions holding that public school teachers are
public officials. See Cor bally v. Kennewich Sch. Dist, 973 P.2d 1074,1077 (Wash. Ct. App.

12

In reality, the question of O'Connor's public official status does not necessarily turn
on such a broad inquiry. Rather, the issue may be narrowly cast as whether the head coach
of a public high school varsity basketball team who has authority over a substantial budget,
staff, roster, fixndraising activities, and travel schedule, and who coaches an exceptionally
talented and nationally recognized player, is a public official. This issue will be addressed
following response to the broad assertion that public school teachers generally cannot be
deemed public officials.
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1999); Campbellv. Robinson, 955 S.W.2d 609,612 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Elstrom v. Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 270, 533 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Kelly v. Bonney, 606 A.2d
693,711 (Conn. 1992); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101,1103 (Okla.
1978); Sewellv. Brookbank, 581 P.2d 267,270 (Ariz. 1978). Of particular note is the sound
reasoning of the Connecticut Supreme Court and of the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The
Connecticut Supreme Court explains:
Robust and wide open debate concerning the conduct of the
teacher in the schools of this state is a matter of great public
importance. . . . [TJeachers' positions, if abused, potentially
might cause serious psychological or physical injury to school
aged children. Unquestionably, members of society are
profoundly interested in the qualifications and performance of
the teachers who are responsible for educating and caring for the
children in their classrooms. Further, teachers exercise almost
unlimited responsibility for the daily implementation of the
governmental interest in educating young people. In the
classroom, teachers are not mere functionaries. Rather, they
conceive and apply both policy and procedure. As a result of
that significant public interest, it is also likely that the media
would not only provide a teacher about whom allegations have
been made with an opportunity to respond, but that the media
would encourage comment by the teacher. Therefore, we
conclude that . . . the plaintiff school teacher was a public
official for defamation purposes.
Kelly, 606 A.2d at 711. The analysis of the Minnesota Court of Appeals is similar:
We conclude that a public school teacher is a public
official.
We note that Minnesota strongly emphasizes
education. Also, teachers act with the authority of the
government. Teachers who abuse their positions may affect
many lives
[0]ur society gives teachers great authority and
holds them in a position of special trust. Given this authority,
the public has a greater than normal interest in being able to
debate and criticize freely the conduct ofpublic school teachers.
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Elstrom, 533 N.W.2d at 56 (quotation and citations omitted). Utah's commitment to
education is no less than that of these states, and the authority and trust reposed in the
teachers of this state is no less significant. Given these considerations, this Court should
likewise conclude that public school teachers are public officials for defamation purposes.
2.

Public High School Varsity Team Coaches are Public Officials.

However, the Court need not determine that all public school teachers are public
officials to affirm the trial court's conclusion that O' Connor was a public official. O' Connor
was not simply a public school classroom teacher. He was head coach of the Lehi High
School girls' basketball team.13 This Court may take note of the fact that "[h]igh school
sports are played not only for the general training and education of the athletes but are
sources of entertainment and interest in the community." (R. 1350); see Standridge v.
Ramey, 733 A.2d 1197, 1202 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1999) ("We may take note of the
fact that the performance of high school athletic teams is often a matter of substantial public
interest within a community."); Utah R. Evid. 201(b) ("A judicially noticed fact must be one
not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . . . generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court[.]"). Indeed, it may be noted that even the major newspapers
in this state regularly report on high school athletics. As head coach, O'Connor had
responsibility over the budget for the girls' basketball program, which was allocated from

13

See Johnson v. Southwestern Newspapers Corp., 855 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1993) (stating that "Johnson was more than a school teacher; he also was the athletic
director and head football coach," and emphasizing that the court's conclusion that Johnson
was a public official was "not based on Ed Johnson's status as a school teacher, for we do
not hold, and no Texas case has held, that a school teacher is a public official").
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public funds. He also oversaw the raising of thousands of dollars of other monies by the
team directly from members of the community, and it was within his discretion how to spend
those funds. O'Connor determined which of the girls who tried out for the team became
team members. He oversaw team travel to games at other schools, state playoff tournaments,
and an invitational tournament in Arizona. He coordinated the girls' participation in a spring
league, summer tournament, and a team camp; and, he supervised four assistant coaches.
Given the foregoing, it cannot be disputed that the coaching position just described is "one
which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart
from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in [this case]." Van
Dyke, 663 P.2d at 55; see Johnson v. Southwestern Newspapers Corp., 855 S.W.2d 182,187
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("As head [high school] football coach, [plaintiff] filled a position of
such importance that the public not only had, but exhibited, an independent interest in his
qualifications and performance, transcending any interest shown in other employees of the
school system.").
5.

O'Connor's Particular Coaching Position Made Him a Public
Official

Furthermore, as O'Connor himself highlights, he was the coach of an exceptionally
talented player who was eventually named the top high school girls basketball player in Utah
and one of the top twenty-four senior girl basketball players in the country. In Madsen v.
United Television, Inc., 797 P.2d 1083 (Utah 1990), this Court was asked to determine
whether a police officer was a public official. The Court stated:
In light of the particular facts of this case, we need not, and
therefore do not, reach the issue of whether a police officer is
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ipso facto a public official. Here, plaintiff was or became a
public official by virtue of the facts and circumstances which
gave rise to [his] killing of [a suspect]. . . . The fact that
plaintiff, acting in his capacity as a law enforcement officer,
shot and killed a person he was attempting to apprehend
propelled him into a category far-removed from that of an
ordinary patrolman.
Id. at 1085. In other words, the plaintiff in Madsen was in a unique position relative to most
other police officers, and that unique position put him more squarely in the public eye and
gave the public more reason to scrutinize the manner in which he discharged the
responsibilities of his position. See id. Similarly here, O'Connor was in a unique position
relative to most other high school coaches in that he was coaching a player with inordinate
talent. This situation placed O'Connor more squarely in the public eye and gave the public
more reason to scrutinize the manner in which he discharged his coaching responsibilities
(including balancing the competing interests of girls with varying skill levels). Hence, even
if there were doubt that a public high school varsity basketball coach with authority over a
substantial budget, staff, roster, fundraising activities, and travel schedule is ipso facto a
public official, the added fact that O'Connor was coaching an exceptionally talented,
nationally recognized, player tips the balance in favor of O'Connor's public official status.
Anyone coaching Michelle would invite public scrutiny and discussion, entirely apart from
the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by particular charges. See Van Dyke, 663 P.2d at 55.
4.

O 'Connor's Arguments Against the Conclusion that He Was a Public
Official Are Unavailing.

The few arguments O'Connor makes in favor of a contrary conclusion reveal a
misapprehension of applicable law. First, O'Connor misreads the requirement that a public
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official be in a position regarding which "'the public has an independent interest in the
qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest
in the qualifications and performance of all government employees.'" Id. at 54-55 (citation
omitted). Relying on this language, he asserts that a high school coach cannot be a public
official because "[t]he coaching selection process is not put to public vote nor determined by
public input but rather is handled internally at the administrative level. . . . Nor does the
public have some right in the termination of a high school coach." (Appellant's Brief, p. 20.)
O'Connor cites, however, no authority for the proposition that to be a public official the
general public must have formal input in decisions regarding one's hiring or firing. In fact,
this Court's holding in Madsen is directly at odds with that implied assertion, where the
public has no formal input on the hiring and firing of police officers and yet the plaintiff
police officer in that case was deemed to be a public official. See 797 P.2d at 1085.
Next, O'Connor asserts that, because extracurricular activities in public schools are
a privilege and not a right, see Starkey v. Bd. ofEduc., 3 81 P.2d 718, 721 (Utah 1963), "the
hiring, firing or retention of a high school English teacher is more important than that of a
high school team coach." (Appellant's Brief, p. 21.) He continues: "Arguably the janitorial
staff and food service personnel in any public school have more impact and contact with the
general student body than does any particular coach." (Id.) Thus, he concludes, "if a high
school girl's basketball coach is a position of such 'apparent importance' that the public at
large has an 'independent interest' in that person's qualifications and performance, then in
truth there is no public employment that would not qualify for 'public official' status." (Id.)
However, public official status does not turn on whether the employee provides a
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constitutionally protected service (such as, perhaps, English education). Nor does it turn on
an objective determination of the value to the community of a public employee's position.
Rather, it turns on whether the position held by the public employee is one that actually
invites public scrutiny, regardless of whether such scrutiny is merited. Thus, the Supreme
Court speaks in terms of "apparent importance" of the position and whether the "public has
an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it," not
whether the public should have such independent interest. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75,
86, 86 S. Ct. 669,676 (1966) (emphasis added); see also Van Dyke, 663 P.2d at 55 (rejecting
the argument 6Cthat to label [the director of financial aid at Weber State University] a 'public
official' would shield almost all defamatory comment directed against an individual of every
rank" because such a contention "omits the element of [actual] debate on public issues").
Finally, O'Connor urges this Court to follow those jurisdictions that have concluded
that public school teachers are not public officials for purposes of defamation. He cites cases
from five such jurisdictions: California, Florida, Illinois, Maine, and New Jersey. However,
all but one of the cases he cites deal solely with public school teachers generally, not with
varsity high school coaches. As set forth above, the evidence is undisputed that O'Connor
was a public official by virtue of his coaching position, regardless of whether all public
school teachers are public officials. Additionally, the reasoning of the Connecticut and
Minnesota courts set forth above is compelling in favor of a conclusion that public school
teachers are public officials and rests on general principles espoused by this Court and public
policy in this state. Accordingly, O'Connor's reliance almost exclusively on cases holding
that public school teachers generally are not public officials is unavailing to him.
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B.

O'Connor Has Adduced No Evidence that the Parents Acted With
Actual Malice.

As demonstrated, O'Connor was a public official. "[A] public official [may not
recover] for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice[.]'" Van Dyke v. KUTV, 663 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah
1983). O'Connor has adduced no evidence that the Parents acted with actual malice, and his
claims must, therefore, fail.
To show actual malice, O'Connor must present evidence that the Parents' statements
were made "[1] with [actual] knowledge that [they were] false or [2] with reckless disregard
of whether [they were] false or not." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,280, 84 S.
Ct. 710, 726 (1964). To show reckless disregard for the truth, "'[t]here must be sufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication.'" Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah 1981)
(citation omitted; emphasis added). "This inquiry is 'a subjective one - there must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant actually had a "high degree
of awareness of... probable falsity."'" Revell v. Hoffman, 309 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir.
2002) (quotingHarte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657,688,109
S. Ct. 2678,2696 (1989) (emphasis added)). As the trial court concluded, "fnjowhere [in the
Record] is there any indication that any ofthe persons who were criticizing [O' Connor] knew
or should have known that they were speaking a falsehood or that they were reckless or
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uncaring as to whether what they were saying was true or not." (R. 1349-50.)14
O'Connor forwards two arguments in support of a contrary conclusion. First, he
contends that the following "evidence" also suggests that the Parents statements were made
with actual malice:
The Parents repeated their allegations of financial improprieties
after having explanations and clarifications given them by both
O'Connor and the high school administration
Likewise, the
Parents repeated their allegations of abuse, recruiting violations
and favoritism after due investigation by the Principal and his
communication to the Parents that no such problems existed.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 33-34.) However, although O'Connor did hold a meeting to explain
his position with respect to team finances (R. 837-41), the Parents did not probe the situation
by asking questions of O'Connor at that meeting (R. 775 (testimony of Judy Harrison that
O'Connor "kept asking for questions and people just didn't ask them")). "Actual malice .
. . is not based on whether a 'reasonably prudent' person would have conducted further
investigation prior to publishing." Revell, 309 F.3d at 1233 (citation omitted). Moreover,
O'Connor's assertion that the principal and/or others in the school administration told the
Parents that their concerns were unfounded is simply at odds with the evidence in the Record.
Principal Worthington testified in this regard as follows:
Q.

. . . [Y]ou believe that that issue [regarding financial
improprieties] had been resolved through your
investigation, correct?

A.

I believe it was resolved.

14

Indeed, as set forth above, the Parents' statements largely contained expressions of
opinion, which are not even capable of being true or false.
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Q.

And you believe that was communicated back to the
parents?

A.

I don't know to what degree. I think it was mentioned,
but I didn't write, I mean I didn't make an attempt to
communicate to every parent.

(R. 1248.) In fact, the letter that Principal Worthington sent to the Parents following his
"investigation" steadfastly avoided any conclusion regarding the validity of the Parents'
expressed concerns; rather, it stated:
It was . . . interesting that even though individual perceptions
were at times directly in opposition with each other, everybody
spoke with a conviction and passion that was compelling.
Where in lies the truth? The truth lies in each one's perception.
Individual perception becomes the truth no matter what did or
didn't happen. The question really becomes, "What is each
person, parent, player, and coach willing to do?" If one is not
willing to try to change their perception, there is no point in
trying because whatever is done will never be good enough. If
this is your reality, perhaps the best thing for you to do is to
move to another community and program that is best suited to
your daughter's situation....
. . . We have spoken to Coach O'Connor and given him
recommendations shared with us by all parents. He has
committed to examine and improve the program wherever he
can. He has our foil support.
(R. 1172.) These facts are remarkably similar to the case of Sewell v. Brookbank, 581 P.2d
267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978), where the parents of school children
did not present their list of grievances to [the plaintiff teacher]
first, but instead, took it to his principal and, despite the fact that
[the plaintiff] answered the complaints and the principal told
[the parents] he thought [the plaintiff] was a good teacher, [the
parents] persisted by going to the superintendent and to the
school board with the complaints.
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Id. at 426. There court concluded, on the foregoing facts, that "there is [not] any evidence
here which shows actual malice." Id. Its reasoning was as follows:
The fact that [the plaintiff teacher] denied the charges and gave
his version and the fact that the principal told the [parents] he
thought [the plaintiff] was a good teacher does not mean that the
[parents], by pursuing the matter, acted with knowledge of the
falsity of their charges. They knew he denied the allegations,
but because of the nature of the complaints, they did not know
they were "false" and his mere denial does not mean such
allegations were false. Nor does the evidence show a reckless
disregard of the truth, i.e., a high degree of awareness of
probable falsity. If we were to hold otherwise then one the
teacher denies any allegation of incompetency even though the
adequacy of his answers are still in question, the matter is ended.
We cannot condone such a result which would allow school
officials to shield the incompetent teacher and thus defeat the
legitimate interest of the parents in their children and the school
system.
Id. (citation omitted). Based on the lack of evidence for O'Connor's assertions and the
persuasive reasoning of the Arizona court in parallel circumstances, this Court should
conclude that, indeed, O'Connor has failed to adduce evidence of actual malice.
O'Connor also contends that "the statements were made not to instigate a further
investigation by the high school or by the School Board, but rather to force a change in the
coaching position" and that this too is evidence of "a high degree or awareness of the falsity
of these charges which had been determined to be baseless but which they nonetheless
proceeded to repeat." (Appellant's Brief, p. 34.) Initially, as already set forth, the Parents
had not been assured by the school administration that their concerns were baseless. To the
contrary, they had been told, essentially, "to change their perception" or "move to another
community." (R. 1172.) Moreover, O'Connor cites no evidence to support the assertion that
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the Parents did not want "a further investigation" and would only be satisfied with "a change
in the coaching position." Additionally, even if these was the Parents' sentiments,15 a "high
degree of awareness of probable falsity" is not established merely because the Parents
insisted on a coaching change. To the contrary, an overwhelming sentiment that a coaching
change was in fact needed, supports a conclusion that the Parents actually believed in the
validity of their expressed concerns.
Having concluded that O'Connor was a public official, the Court should also
conclude, for the foregoing reasons, that there is no evidence that the Parents' statements
were made with actual malice; and, based on these conclusions, the Court should affirm the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Parents.
IIL
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PARENTS BECAUSE
THEIR STATEMENTS WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED.
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
Parents because their statements were absolutely privileged.16 An "absolute privilege . . .
extends to the proceedings of administrative officers, such as boards and commissions, so
far as they have powers of discretion in applying the law to the facts which are regarded as
judicial, or 'quasi-judicial' in character." Mortensen v. Life Ins. Corp., 315 P.2d 283, 284

15

Here again, O'Connor fails to distinguish between the individual Parent defendants,
proceeding as though all made the same statements and were motivated by the same
sentiments. This is plainly not the case, and his failure to cite evidence with respect to each
of the Parents should, alone, merit this Court's dismissal of his claims.
16

This argument was raised and briefed in the trial court. (R. 985-86, 1313-14.)
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(Utah 1957). In Utah,
[n]o civil action by or on behalf of a student to the professional
competence or performance of a licensed employee of aschool
district,... or a violation of ethical conduct by an employee of
a school district, may be brought in a court until at least 60 days
after the filing of a written complaint with the local board of
education of the district, or until findings have been issued by
the local board after a hearing on the complaint, whichever is
sooner.
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-421(l)(a). The School Board's invitation to the Parents to submit
letters, and the comments by some Parents at the July 20,2004 School Board meeting might,
in light of Section 53A-3-421(l)(a), properly be seen as a part of "proceedings of
administrative officers, such as boards and commissions, so far as they have powers of
discretion in applying the law to the facts." Mortensen, 315 P.2d at 284. Hence, this Court
should hold that an absolute privilege attaches to the Parents' statements made in this context
and affirm the summary judgment in favor of the Parents.
IV.
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PARENTS BECAUSE
(1) THEIR STATEMENTS WERE QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED AND
(2) THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PARENTS ABUSED THE
PRIVILEGE.
"The publication of a defamatory statement is conditionally or qualifiedly privileged
in certain situations in which a defendant seeks to vindicate or further an interest 'regarded
as being sufficiently important to justify some latitude for making mistakes

'" Brehany

v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991). "If a qualified privilege exists, the burden
is on the plaintiff to prove that the privilege was abused." Id. "The plaintiff can show abuse

-39-

of the privilege by proving that the defendant acted with malice or that the publication of the
defamatory material extended beyond those who had a legally justified reason for receiving
it." Id. In this case, (1) the Parents' statements were qualifiedly privileged, and (2) there is
no evidence that the Parents abused that privilege. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Parents.17
A.

The Parents Statements Were Qualifiedly Privileged.

The Parents statements were qualifiedly privileged. Section 594 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts set forth one circumstance that gives rise to a qualified privilege, and this
Court expressly adopted Section 594 in Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah
1991). There, the Court summarized Section 594 by explaining that "[t]he law has long
recognized that a publication is conditionally privileged if made to protect a legitimate
interest of the publisher." Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58; see alsoAlfordv. UtahLeague of Cities
& Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah Ct App. 1990). Section 594 reads in full as follows:
An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the
circumstances induce a correct or reasonable beliefthat (a) there
is information that affects a sufficiently important interest of the
publisher, and (b) the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory
matter will be of service in the lawful protection of the interest.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 594 (1977). Additionally, Section 597 is a particularized
application of the principle set forth in Section 594, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 594

17

This argument was raised and briefed in the trial court (R. 983-84,1188-91,1316-

1318).
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cmt. d,18 and states in relevant part:
(1) An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if
the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that (a)
there is information that affects the well-being of a member of
the immediate family of the publisher, and (b) the recipient's
knowledge of the defamatory matter will be of service in the
lawful protection of the well-being of the member of the family.
(2) An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged
when the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief
that (a) there is information that affects the well-being of a
member of the immediate family . . . of a third person, and (b)
the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter will be of
service in the lawful protection of the well-being of the member
of the family, and (c) the recipient has requested the publication
of the defamatory matter or is a person to whom its publication
is otherwise within generally accepted standards of decent
conduct.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 597 (1977).
In Brehany, the Court also endorsed Section 596, explaining that a qualified "privilege
also extends to statements made to advance a legitimate common interest between the
publisher and the recipient of the publication." 812 P.2d at 58. Section 596 states in Ml as
follows:
An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the
circumstances lead any one of several persons having a common
interest in a particular subject matter correctly or reasonably to

18

Because the rule stated in Section 597 is merely a particularized application of the
rule stated in Section 594, it would "not [be] much of a jurisprudential leap" for this Court
to expressly adopt Section 597. Atkinson v. Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, 2001 UT App
63, f 19 n. 6,21 P.3d 667 (noting that "[t]he appellate courts of this state [had] not previously
adopted section 324 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts" and stating that doing so in that
case was "not much of a jurisprudential leap since 'the rule stated in [section 324] is [merely]
an application of the one stated in [section] 323.'" (citation omitted; emphasis and alterations
in original)).
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believe that there is information that another sharing the
common interest is entitled to know.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 596 (1977).
As O'Connor correctly observes, no reported Utah cases have examined the
application of the foregoing privileges - the "common interest" privilege or the "family
relationships" privilege - in the context of allegedly defamatory statements made by parents
to public school officials about a teacher or coach. However, the great weight of authority
from other jurisdictions is that these privileges apply to the facts of this case. In each of the
following cases, the court held that parent and school administrator defamation plaintiffs
were protected by one of the foregoing qualified privileges. See Daubenmire v. Sommers,
805 N.E.2d 571, 593 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (holding that "educators and parents share a
common interest in the training, morality and well-being of children in their care" which
extends to "the coaching of [a high school] team and... the treatment of [team] player[s]");
Gatto v. St. Richard School Inc., 774 N.E.2d 914, 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("Parents and
schools have a 'corresponding interest' in the free flow of information about administrators
and faculty members."); Sewell v. Brookbank, 581 P.2d 267, 270-71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978)
(discussing the "legitimate interest of the parents in their children and the school system");
Martin v. Kearney, 124 Cal. Rptr. 281, 283 (1975) ("As parents of school children,
defendants were interested persons directing their communications to other interested
persons, the school officials"); Hoover v. Jordan, 150 P. 333, 334 (Colo. Ct. App. 1915)
(holding that parents' petition to the school board charging that teacher was incompetent and
immoral was protected under the common interest privilege). The statements on which
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O'Connor bases his defamation claims were all expressions of concern by the Parents for
their girls to school administrators who shared their interest in the girls' well-being and who
could address the Parents concerns. Accordingly, Parents enjoyed a qualified privilege when
making the statements of which O'Connor complains.
O'Connor asserts that the foregoing privileges should not apply to all of the Parents
because some of them were not the actual parents of girls on the team. (Appellant's Brief,
p. 41 ,)19 He asserts that those of the Parents who were merely "friends or relatives" of girls
on the team do not share a common interest with the girls' parents. (Id.)20 Even if true,
O'Connor's assertion does not deprive the "friend and relative" Parents of a qualified
privilege in this case. In Brehany, this Court also adopted Section 595 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, see 812 P.2d at 58, which states:
(1) An occasion that makes a publication conditionally
privileged if the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable
belief that (a) there is information that affects a sufficiently
important interest of the recipient or a third person, and (b) the
recipient is one to whom the publisher is under a legal duty to
publish the defamatory matter or is a person to whom its
publication is otherwise within the generally accepted standards
of decent conduct.
(2) In determining whether a publication is within generally
accepted standards of decent conduct it is an important factor
that (a) the publication is made in response to a request rather
than volunteered by the publisher or (b) a family or other
relationship exists between the parties.

19

O'Connor cites no evidence to identify which of the Parents fit into this category.

20

O'Connor also asserts that "the School Board members... had no common interest
with the Parents." (Appellant's Brief, p. 41.) This assertion is belied by the above-cited
authority from numerous jurisdictions holding to the contrary.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 595 (1977). Applying this section to the receipt of public
comment to school boards on the performance of school employees, the Florida Supreme
Court explained as follows:
Another ground for holding that the statement was conditionally
privileged would be that the statement was made for the
protection of the recipient's interest in receiving information on
the performance of its employee. See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 595 (1976). In this connection, the value of the
defendant's defamatory information to the school board in
overseeing the operation of the public schools must be weighed
against the extent of the harm likely to be done to the plaintiffs
reputation as a result of the communication. L. Eldredge, The
Law of Defamation § 86 at 471 (1978). Under the American
Law Institute's approach, the interest of the school board in
the performance of a teacher, its employee, would give rise
to a privilege in another to provide information concerning
that performance even without a legal duty or a family
relationship and even though the information is not
requested but merely volunteered, if the publication is '"within
the generally accepted standards of decent conduct."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 595 (1976).
Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So.2d 803, 809 (Fla. 1984) (emphasis added). Plainly, under
Section 595, which has been adopted by this Court, the statements by all of the Parents to the
school board, principal, and athletics director were protected by a qualified privilege, so long
as they were made within the generally accepted standards of decent conduct. And the
following undisputed evidence (testimony from Alpine School Board member Donna
Barnes) supports only the conclusion that the communications ofwhich O'Connor complains
were made within the generally accepted standards of decent conduct:
Q.

Okay. Do you personally believe that the parents were
exercising their rights as parents living in the school
district to voice concerns at a school board meeting about
what they perceived to be problems?
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A.

That's the policy of the board, that if there are concerns,
they may address the board in an open board meeting. It
happens routinely.

Q.

Was everyone [at the meeting where the Parents
addressed the board] courteous and attempting to -

A.

Very courteous, very professional in their behavior.

Q.

Okay. And certainly there's nothing unusual about
parents writing letters to be reviewed by the board as
supplemental information to -

A.

We get those routinely also.

Q.

Okay. And did you consider those to be constructive
letters in attempting to resolve a problem?

A.

I did.

(R. 1151a, 1239.)
O'Connor's remaining arguments against application of a qualified privilege to the
Parents' statements are without factual, legal, or logical support. Specifically, he argues that
the privilege should not apply because (1) the Parents' letters "were created not at the request
of any public authority" (Appellant's Brief, p. 38); (2) the Parents' letters "were delivered
. . . not to a governmental body but to [a] friend and neighbor Donna Barnes, who in her
individual capacity had no authority to deal with them" (id, pp. 38-39); and (3) "the School
Board declined to take any action on the letters submitted to the Board and the statements
made at the meeting" (id., p. 41). As to the first argument, the evidence is undisputed that
the Parents' letter were requested by a public authority, in that school board member Donna
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Barnes, after her consultation with the school board president, told the Parents that if they
had concerns they needed to "build a case" by preparing and submitting letters. (R. 1151 a.)
Moreover, as explained by the Nodar court, "the interest of the school board in the
performance of a teacher, its employee, would give rise to a privilege in another to provide
information concerning that performance . . . even though the information is not requested
but merely volunteered" Nodar, 462 So.2d at 809. As to the second argument, O'Connor
offers no support for the assertion that communications to a school board member must take
place only within the confines of a duly convened board meeting for the qualified privilege
to attach. As to the final argument, O'Connor again offers no support for the implied
assertion that an otherwise privileged statement becomes unprivileged when, in retrospect,
it is observed that the recipient declined to take action based on the communication. Such
a rule, which would tie the qualified privilege to the response of the recipient, would cast a
chill on public input to school boards and undermine the privilege.
In sum, this Court has already adopted the principles in Sections 594, 595, and 596
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and Section 597 is a logical extension of Section 594.
The circumstances of this case trigger application of the principles outlined in these sections,
O' Connor's contrary arguments notwithstanding. Hence, the Court should hold that all of the
Parents' were qualifiedly privileged in making the statements of which O' Connor complains.
B.

There Is No Evidence that the Parents Abused Their Qualified
Privilege.

"[O'Connor], in order to circumvent [the Parents' qualified privilege], must show that
[their] statements were published maliciously." See Alford v. Utah League of Cities &
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Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). "Evidence of 'malice5 in this context[21]
may include indications that the publisher [1] 'made [the statements] with ill will, [2] [that
the statements] were excessively published, or [3] [that the publisher] did not reasonably
believe his or her statements."' Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 UT 25,
T| 53, 116 P.3d 271 (citation omitted). There is no evidence in the Record to support a
conclusion that the Parents abused their qualified privilege by making their allegedly
defamatory statements maliciously.
O'Connor's asserts to the contrary, arguing that "[t]here is sufficient evidence in the
Record to conclude that the Parents made and repeated their defamatory statements with ill
will." (Appellant's Brief, p. 34.) He contends that evidence of the Parent's ill will is to be
found in (1) their repeating their statements "despite receiving explanations of no financial
improprieties and receiving the principal's assurance that there were no coaching problems
of the type alleged; (2) certain Parents' manifested intent to have O'Connor fired; and (3)
that "[t]hey ultimately took their complaints to a public forum," i.e., a school board meeting.
(Id.) O'Connor's argument in this regard is without merit. First, as set forth in Section II.B,
above, the Record does not support the assertion that the Parents received assurances from
the principal that their concerns were unfounded. Second, that some of the Parents may have
wanted O'Connor fired was, plainly, an outgrowth of their concerns for the girls and the

21

The context referred to here is that of a conditional privilege. "[M]alice in the
context of a conditional privilege 'is simply a means of determining when the privilege
. . . is forfeited.'" Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 UT25, ^ 53 n.19,116
P.3d 271 (citation omitted). In the public official context, on the other hand, a plaintiff must
show "actual malice," which is different than the common law malice required in this
context. See id.
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basketball program.

"[I]f [an allegedly defamatory] publication is made for the purpose

ofprotecting the interest in question, [i.e., the Parents9 interest in their daughters' well-being;
the common interest in public education, etc.], the fact that the publication is inspired in part
by resentment or indignation at the supposed misconduct of the person defamed does not
constitute an abuse of the privilege." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 603 cmt. a (1977).
Finally, O' Connor cites no authority for the proposition that privileged statements to a school
board are lost if made at a public meeting, and there is authority for the contrary proposition
- that the Parents did not abuse their conditional privilege by failing to insist that the school
board meeting be closed to other members of the public. See Daubenmire v. Sommers, 805
NJE.2d 571, 577, 593 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (holding a qualified privilege exited where
parents spoke out against coach at a community meeting where school board members were
present); Sewell v. Brookbank, 581 P.2d 267, 269-71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding a
qualified privilege existed where parents spoke out against teacher at a school board
meeting).
V.
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO ADDRESS ISSUES
REGARDING THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS TO THE
PARENTS BECAUSE THOSE ISSUES ARE NOT PROPERLY
BEFORE THIS COURT, AND IN ANY EVENT THE PARENTS'
VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS WAS TIMELY FILED.
On January 17,2006, O'Connor filed his Notice of Appeal from the trial court's entry
of its final order of summary judgment. The trial court did issue its ruling regarding costs

22

Here again, O'Connor lumps all of the Parents together and fails to demonstrate that
all of them insisted that he be fired, or that all of them attended the school board meeting.
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and fees until February 14, 2006. In appeals to this Court, "[t]he notice of appeal... shall
designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 3(d).
O'Connor filed his Notice of Appeal prior to the trial court's ruling on costs and did not
designate that portion of court's final order in his Notice of Appeal. Accordingly, issues
regarding the trial court's award of costs are not properly before this Court, and the Court
should, therefore, decline to consider them. See id.
Even if the Court determines that this issue is properly before it, contrary to
O'Connor's assertion, the Parents' Verified Memorandum of Costs was timely filed. It was
due on January 19, 2006. Parent Defendants deposited it into the United States Postal
Service, postage prepaid, on January 18, 2006. The rule regarding the manner of filing
documents with the Court states: "The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as
required by these rules shall be made by filling them with the clerk of the court

" Utah

R. Civ. P. 5(e). This rule does not specify whether filing is complete upon mailing or upon
receipt by the clerk, and no reported Utah case appears to have addressed this issue
specifically with respect to rule 5(e) and the filing of a costs memorandum. In Isaacson v.
Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983), however, the court addressed whether a notice of appeal
was filed by mailing. The appellant offered no evidence, but claimed that he had placed his
notice of appeal in the mail on Thursday, December 10. See id. at 850. It was due on
Monday, December 14, but not date-stamped by the clerk until December 16. See id. In
dissent, Justice Stewart stated:
Counsel acted prudently in attempting to effectuate a timely
filing of a notice of appeal in accordance with our rules of
procedure. The reason the notice was not actually filed with the
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court in the time prescribed by the rules was either because of
the delay in the delivery of mail or because of the failure of the
clerk to file the notice promptly upon receipt. In either event,
the fault was not the appellant's. Indeed the appellant had the
right to rely on the mail's being delivered in time and on timely
filing by the clerk.
Id. at 851 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The majority rejected Justice Stewart's approach, stating
that "[t]he dissents assume facts not in the record[, L e., that the notice of appeal was actually
mailed on December 10,] in reaching a contrary conclusion." Id. at 850 n. 1. Contrastingly
here, there is evidence that the Parents' Verified Memorandum of Costs was indeed mailed
on January 18,2006, the day before it was due. (R. 1540.) Accordingly, Parent Defendants
urge the Court to adopt the approach of Justice Stewart with respect to a notice of appeal and
conclude that filing of the Verified Memorandum of Costs was complete upon mailing.23
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Parents and the trial court's award of costs to the Parents.
DATED this 5 /

day of May, 2006.
SUITTER AXLAND, P L L C
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*

Mkmael W. Homer
/Jesse C. Trentadue
JohnD.Luthy
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In this respect, it is notable that, according to the date stamp, if Parent Defendants'
Verified Memorandum of Costs was not already at the Court on Thursday, January 19, on
Friday, January 20, a postal delivery to the court, opening of the mail, and stamping of the
document all must have occurred before 9:30 a.m., a somewhat remarkable proposition.
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